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THE LOCKERBIE TERRORIST ATTACK AND LIBYA: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS*
Steve Emersont
Following the horrific terrorist crime that saw Pan Am flight 103
literally blown out of the sky, an incredible journey of forensic
investigations and intelligence began that ultimately resulted in a
momentous court verdict in 2001. The forensic investigation alone into Pan
Am 103, was one of the most intense, meticulous and expensive criminal
investigations ever undertaken.
As many will recall, the initial theory was that Iran had effectively
"subcontracted" this murderous project to Syria and Libya in retaliation for
the U.S. downing of an Iranian jet. In fact, in the months before the Pan
Am 103 bombing, a Syrian cell possessing barometric bombs had been
arrested in Frankfurt. It was thought at the time that these bombs were to
be placed on aircraft departing from Frankfurt to Britain. That theory
changed dramatically eighteen months later after the discovery of a
thumbnail sized microchip in the fields outside of London. This chip was
forensically traced to a Swiss manufacturer which, in turn, was finally
traced to Libya.
Rather than detail the actual components of the investigation, it is
helpful to step back and consider the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial
from a cost-benefit analysis perspective to determine whether U.S. interests
were ultimately served. On the plus side, it is clear that the conviction of
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi provided the opportunity for the world to gain at
least a partial insight into the culpability and involvement of Libya in
international terrorism. Al Megrahi was convicted and sentenced to a
minimum of twenty years in prison before parole eligibility although the
concurrent nature of sentencing in this case means that he may only wind
up serving one month for each victim that he killed. In the criminal justice
world, mass killers that benefit from concurrent sentences are described as
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getting "freebies". It is no less offensive and inappropriate in cases of
terrorist murder.
A Scottish court found that al-Megrahi was "serving a foreign
government," but the absence of any further prosecution left open the
question of whether he was acting alone or possibly as a rogue agent.
Additionally, his alleged accomplice was acquitted and the Libyan dictator,
Muammar Gaddafi was never found to be criminally liable. Megrahi's
conviction did however clearly demonstrate that the Libyan government
itself was implicated in the conspiracy to commit the terrorist act and few
believe that much gets done in Libya without Gaddafi's specific direction.
Despite this, while the trial focused international attention on Gaddafi's
terrorist regime, Gaddafi himself continued to insist he had nothing to do
with the bombing. Thus, notwithstanding U.S. intelligence, both classified
and de-classified, the fact remains that the presumptive mastermind for
many of the Lockerbie atrocity, Muammar Gaddafi, ultimately escaped
criminal liability.
Libya was subjected to sanctions by the U.N. in 1992 after refusing to
turn over the two suspects. Seven years later, the sanctions were suspended
by the U.N. after Gaddafi extradited the suspects. However, rather than
turn over the suspects to the United States or Britain, Gaddafi negotiated a
special arrangement in which a Scottish court held in the Netherlands
served as the venue for the trial. The result of this deal was that Gaddafi
secured preferential treatment for the suspects, compared to the treatment
they would have received had they been extradited to the United States.
After the conclusion of the trial in 2001, Gaddafi's reaction was
consistent with his bizarre personality. He insisted that the evidence was
fabricated, and that Megrahi was totally innocent, and he scoffed at the
judgment that granted the victims' families $700 M in damages. Candidly,
it should be acknowledged that Gaddafi, in his individual capacity, was able
to negotiate an incredibly favorable deal using his inexplicable leverage
with the international and European community. The net result was that he
was able to insulate himself from any sort of criminal culpability or moral
responsibility.
Indeed, shortly after the verdict was rendered, Libya resumed trade
with virtually every country in the world except for Britain and the United
States. During the period of international sanctions Libya sought
international investments in its natural gas and oil industries. Spain and
Germany wanted to invest in these industries, but, in the presence of
international sanctions, chose not do so. Even so, during this period, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League lobbied the
non-aligned community to lift the sanctions. The members of both the
Arab League and the OAU violated the sanctions. These member-nations
continued to trade with Gaddafi and provided him with the aviation links
that had been severed after the imposition of U.N sanctions.
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The pressure exerted by the United States and the United Kingdom
was effectively neutralized, in light of Gaddafi's worldwide constituency.
In the end, the resolution of the Lockerbie "dispute" could be said to have
been "conveniently achieved." Megrahi's conviction absolved European
nations of the need to continue imposing sanctions against Libya. Rather
than pursue the issue of Gaddafi's involvement in the plot as evidence of
state-sponsored terrorism, the pretension was legitimately advanced that
'justice' had been achieved. After the verdict, the U.S. continued to apply
sanctions against Gaddafi, but he was otherwise able to re-integrate himself
into the world community.
Gaddafi, however, still felt the pressure and isolation from the
continuation of U.S. sanctions during the civil lawsuit initiated by the
families of the victims of Pan Am 103. The Libyan reaction to the guilty
verdict was truly schizophrenic in nature. Gaddafi himself rejected it, but
also accepted its consequences in some limited ways. In the end, however,
the question was whether the United States could satisfy and reconcile the
basic interests of the victims and our national security.
The conviction achieved through the trial, from an intelligence
perspective, did not do justice to all the evidence that was collected and
developed. This was because of the presence of intelligence that could not
satisfy the burden imposed by the applicable evidence rules. Either the
veracity of the intelligence could not be proven, or the intelligence was not
"actionable intelligence" that could be corroborated in a court of law. This
difficulty represented an unintended but profoundly important
foreshadowing for post 9/11 terrorism trials.
To this day, the people that believe al-Megrahi coordinated, planned
and executed this attack on his own could probably fit in a phone booth.
This begs the questions of who provided support and resources to Megrahi
and who ordered the attack and will they ever be brought to justice? U.S.
officials declared that they would continue the investigation, but in reality,
the 12 year odyssey and investigation has run its course. In looking beyond
the criminal proceedings, another important question needs to be asked; did
the prosecution have a deterrent effect on Gaddafi and his support for
terrorism?
It must be acknowledged, even by those who have been critical of the
trial, that Gaddafi ended his logistical support for international terrorism
although the real motivation for Gaddafi's decision still remains a matter of
speculation. In late 2003, in another part of the extended story, the U.S.
announced that Gaddafi had surprisingly agreed to forfeit his weapons of
mass destruction in exchange for the U.S. terminating its sanctions. This
process is underway but in typical Gaddafi fashion, the story has taken a
bizarre twist.
Earlier in 2004, Gaddafi, himself, was named as a perpetrator in a plot
to have the Saudi leader, Crown Prince Abdullah assassinated, supposedly
as a result of a personal insult during an Arab leaders meeting. The person
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alleging Gaddafi's involvement in this plot was none other than
Abdurahman Alamoudi, himself a notorious American based Muslim leader
who founded the Islamic Society of Boston and the prison and military
Islamic chaplaincy programs. Both of these entities of Almoudi's are under
intense scrutiny given the undeniable links within each to the propagation
of Salafist extremist Islam within America itself.
Recently, Alamoudi pled guilty to charges associated with this plot,
and is now serving a lengthy prison sentence. Alamoudi claimed at his
sentencing that Gaddafi paid him to orchestrate a conspiracy to assassinate
Crown Prince Abdullah. Of course, Gaddafi has denied any involvement in
this plot, but one of his top intelligence agents was arrested in Saudi Arabia
and has allegedly confessed to playing a role in this plot. At the same time,
Gaddafi, according to U.S. officials has opened up his weapons of mass
destruction facilities to full inspection -- the first time a rogue state that
intended to acquire WMD was going to reverse its course.
In looking back at the Lockerbie trial, the question remains whether
U.S. interests with respect to national security, justice, and deterrence were
achieved. Did Syria and Iran get a pass? Did Gaddafi get away with
murder? Clearly, the answer is "yes." But the question remains whether, in
fact, in a pre-9/11 environment, and with the inability to use actionable
intelligence to retaliate immediately, did the U.S. have any other
alternative?
It's easy to say in a post-9/1 I environment that there should have been
an immediate military response. This is something that many believe was
justified in 1986, when the United States retaliated against Gaddafi for the
disco bombing in Germany, and would have been justified had the U.S.
decided to take military action in the wake of Pan Am 103. However,
considering that this was a pre-9/ 11 environment and that there was a delay
in finding the actual intelligence, it was very difficult for the U.S. to
unilaterally initiate some type of military response.
In hindsight, some U.S. interests were clearly served by the Lockerbie
prosecution and Libya is apparently on the road to rejoining the non
terrorist world, albeit with closer scrutiny. It may be true that a more
vigorous military response akin to the post 9/11 actions against the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda would have been more effective but it is equally undeniable
that Libya is no longer the threat it once was. Whether that's because of a
genuine change of heart in Mr. Gaddafi or a recognition on his part that
'Death from Above' comes in a Libyan version is debatable. What's most
important is that one more Middle Eastern Islamic tyrant appears to have
got the point.
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